Naturalism, non-factualism, and normative situated behaviour
Manuel Heras-Escribano, Manuel de Pinedo
South African Journal of Philosophy January 2, 2018 DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2017.1422633 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 11 |
| Key points | Argues that the normative character of unreflective situated behavior is not factual and that reductionism and enactivism wrongly share a factualist assumption. Proposes that normative vocabulary is ineliminable for explaining situated practices and that factualism commits the is-ought fallacy, concluding folk psychological explanation is compatible with ontological naturalism when descriptivism is rejected. |
Abstract
This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts can make true or false our attributions of cognitive, mental and agential abilities. We will argue against this view by describing the main features and problems of reductionism and enactivism and then we will offer two arguments against this shared factualist assumption: (1) normative vocabulary is ineliminable if we want a complete explanation of our situated practices; and (2) the factualist assumption is a species of the is-ought fallacy. Finally, we will claim that a folk psychological explanation of our normative practices is fully compatible with ontological naturalism when such descriptivist or factualist assumption is rejected.