Why pretense poses a problem for 4E cognition (and how to move forward)
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences December 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-021-09745-y (opens in new tab) via Springer Nature
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractWhether someone is pretending depends on their beliefs and intentions, which creates a problem for 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) accounts of pretense that typically try to explain psychological phenomena without invoking such internal cognitive states. The article examines tensions within three recent 4E theories of imagination and pretense, then proposes a path forward that allows explanations to include beliefs and intentions while remaining consistent with 4E principles. To genuinely explain pretense, 4E theorists must accept that two agents with identical short-term outward behaviors and environments may be guided by different beliefs and intentions, making only one of them a pretender. The scientific explanation of pretense thus remains tied to the broader project of determining which beliefs and intentions to ascribe to which entities based on their behaviors.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Pretense Pretend Embodied cognition Ecological psychology Belief |
| Key finding | Argues that 4E accounts of pretense must incorporate beliefs and intentions to adequately explain the phenomenon, as two agents with identical outward behavior may differ in whether they are pretending due to differing internal states. |
Abstract
Whether a person is pretending, or not, is a function of their beliefs and intentions. This poses a challenge to 4E accounts of pretense, which typically seek to exclude such cognitive states from their explanations of psychological phenomena. Resulting tensions are explored within three recent accounts of imagination and pretense offered by theorists working in the 4E tradition. A path forward is then charted, through considering ways in which explanations can invoke beliefs and intentions while remaining true to 4E precepts. To make real progress in explaining pretense, 4E theorists will need to grow comfortable with the idea that two agents whose outward behaviors and environments are, in the short term, the same, may be guided by quite different beliefs and intentions, in virtue of which only one is pretending. In this way, the scientific project of explaining pretense remains inseparable from the more general project of determining which beliefs and intentions are appropriate to ascribe to which kinds of entities, given which kinds of behaviors.