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Transcendental Subjectivity in Phenomenology of Perception

Joseph C. Berendzen

Embodied Idealism June 22, 2023 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192874764.003.0008 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that although Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on embodiment and the "anonymous" element of experience creates difficulties for a transcendental idealist conception of mind, his position remains compatible with the transcendental interpretation of phenomenology; the discussion of the "tacit cogito" and temporality extends this reading of the embodied mind.

Abstract

Abstract: Chapter 6 set to the side some problems that arise for the transcendental interpretation of Phenomenology. This chapter considers those problems insofar as they are related to consciousness and subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the connection between body and world suggests the possibility that our experience is shaped by elements outside the scope of subjectivity. Specifically, his notion of an “anonymous” element of our experience poses difficulties for the transcendental idealist conception of the mind. Despite these problems, this chapter argues that Merleau-Ponty’s view is ultimately compatible with the transcendental interpretation. This leads to a consideration of the “tacit cogito” and temporality, and deepens the book’s consideration of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the embodied mind.

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