Monophenomenalism (English Translation)

Abstract

This paper formulates a philosophical position called monophenomenalism. Its starting point is that everything that exists is a phenomenon, and that the phenomenon is one. Unity here does not mean the numerical unity of a single object or the denial of distinctions between things and events. It indicates a refusal to introduce, as a starting explanatory principle, a second ground established independently of and external to the phenomenon. The argument for the position begins from the fact that any claim, doubt, or proof available to us is formulated and assessed within experiencing. A claim about a ground independent of experiencing cannot be justified by moving to a standpoint wholly independent of experiencing. This argument, however, establishes a limit to justification; it does not prove that everything that exists is identical with experiencing or that independent reality is absent. Monophenomenalism is proposed as a philosophical position adopted as a starting point, not as a compulsory deductive conclusion. The paper examines the relation of monophenomenalism to monism, phenomenalism, neutral monism, Advaita Vedānta, idealism, phenomenology, and radical constructivism. It identifies the position's putative distinctive features and the questions that require further investigation. The Model of the Phenomenon is considered as one possible research tool within monophenomenalism. It does not serve as proof of the position, but makes it possible to analyze interpretations and implications, distinguish immediate conclusions from claims requiring additional premises, and test the logical consistency of arguments. This is an exploratory study. Its aim is to formulate the position, mark the limits of its claims, define its relation to existing philosophical approaches, and outline a space for further inquiry.Full text (machine-readable version) https://prostostone.github.io/Monophenomenalism/monophenomenalism_en.txt