The Fundamental Phenomenality Hypothesis

Abstract

The Fundamental Phenomenality Hypothesis (FPH) identifies phenomenal consciousness witha specific class of computational states in predictive brains. Subjective experience occurswhen a hierarchical generative model jointly satisfies four conditions: (i) sufficient integratedhierarchical content, indexed by the magnitude of generatively engaged inference acrosshierarchical levels; (ii) self-referential closure across indexical, reflexive (in baseline andattentional modes), and pragmatic dimensions; (iii) valence integration through precision-weighted interoceptive prediction; and (iv) sustained temporal coherence across the speciouspresent. Three conditions combine multiplicatively in a functional phi grading instantaneousphenomenal density; the fourth operates as an integration envelope and minimum-durationgate over which phi is averaged to yield the phenomenal criticality functional Phi_FPH.Components are characterized as jointly rather than independently structurally adequate:each supplies a structural aspect required for phenomenality, and the multiplicative formcaptures their joint sufficiency at the limit of any component’s collapse. The frameworkis developed within active inference, anchored to operational protocols, and consistency-tested through computational simulation. It generates within-subject graded phenomenalitypredictions across biological systems, contemplative states (calibrated by practice level throughdual compensation mechanisms), and artificial architectures. The position is type-B physicalistwith a supplementary architectural-constitutive reading of phenomenal concepts: the identitybetween Phi_FPH-satisfying states and phenomenal experience is defended on inference-to-best-explanation grounds. Two conditionals are carried in the open rather than left implicit:the claim to cover the standard explananda holds only if that inference-to-best-explanationwarrant is granted, and only if the reductions of nearby candidate explananda are achievablealong the lines indicated, which the paper marks as programmatic rather than accomplished.The framework engages the metaproblem, addresses unity and temporal flow through threestructural states underlying categorical ”unity” reports, supplies a comparative structuralassay for biological and artificial systems, contrasts itself with competing theories (IIT 4.0,GNW, HOT, illusionism, Russellian monism), develops applied implications for AI consciousnessassessment and animal moral status, and specifies the conditions under which it would befalsified.