From Phenomenological Absence to Qualia
Mohamed Taqi
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) March 22, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19168572 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that panpsychism follows only from a particular, independently refutable model of how phenomenological contents compose, and that rejecting this assumption removes the pressure toward panpsychism. Proposes instead a transcendental argument that consciousness is necessitated by the form of composition itself, even when elementary parts carry no experience, a position the authors call "null monism" under the assumption of monism. |
Abstract
Panpsychism holds that experience must already be present in elementary matter for consciousness to arise at the macroscopic level. We argue that this conclusion, however carefully motivated, follows only if one assumes a particular — and independently refutable — model of how phenomenological contents compose. Once that assumption is identified and rejected, the pressure towards panpsychism dissolves. In its place, a transcendental argument shows that consciousness is not distributed through matter but necessitated by the form of composition itself, even when every elementary part carries nothing at all. The position, under the assumption of monism, is called null monism.