Phenomenology and the Question of Man

Jan Patočka and Martin Heidegger both explore phenomenology and human phenomena, but they diverge on whether humanism can ground an understanding of humanity. Patočka credits Heidegger with realizing Wilhelm Dilthey's aim of understanding humans on their own terms, by focusing on what distinguishes them from other beings without external reference. However, Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism" argues that humanism is a form of metaphysics that fails to grasp human finitude, preventing mastery over truth. Patočka further contends that phenomenality—how things appear—is not something humans freely produce. The chapter examines these philosophical positions without endorsing one.

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Abstract

This chapter examines the philosophical reflections of Jan Patočka and Martin Heidegger regarding phenomenology and the question of human phenomena. According to Patočka, Heidegger is the thinker who realized Wilhelm Dilthey's idea of “understanding the human on the basis of the human” by starting from what separates the human from all other beings, without recourse to anything foreign to humanity. In his “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger argues that humanism is a form of metaphysics, yet to understand the human in such a perspective is precisely not to understand the human on the basis of itself— that is, on the basis of a finitude that prevents the human from becoming master of truth. The chapter also considers Patočka's claim that phenomenality cannot be the work of our freedom.