Skip to content

First Steps in Experimental Phenomenology

Roberto Poli

IGI Global eBooks January 18, 2011 DOI: 10.4018/9781599041117.ch012 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 1
Key points Argues that the phenomenic level of analysis of the psyche is autonomous and non-reducible, drawing on the theory of levels of reality, the act/object distinction, the structure of internal time, and the distinction between egological and non-egological acts, as illustrated by experiments by Meinong and Benussi.

Abstract

The main thesis defended by this paper is the thesis of the autonomy – i.e., non-reducibility -- of the phenomenic level of analysis of the psyche. The thesis will be defended by exploiting four main ideas: (1) the theory of levels of reality, (2) the distinction between act and object of presentation, (3) the structure of internal time, and (4) the distinction between egological and non egological acts. I shall present these theses from the point of view of the experiments conducted by Meinong and his pupils, notably Benussi, first at Graz and then at Padua. I may therefore claim that I am here adopting the point of view of what has been called experimental phenomenology, meaning the experimental study of phenomenic or first-person experiences.Request access from your librarian to read this chapter's full text.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Explore topics