What is there to explain about free will? An “easy problem” of consciousness downstream of agency
PsyArXiv Preprints October 11, 2026 preprint DOI: osf:98mxc_v2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Mystical experience |
| Keywords | Agency Consciousness Free will Superstition |
| Key points | Argues that the experience of free will is an "easy problem" of consciousness that can be measured, manipulated, predicted, and mechanistically explained under a working postulate of causal determinism, potentially via causal misattribution and superstitious conditioning without consciousness having independent causal power. Proposes distinguishing free will from agency, which is characterized as a causally consequential, graded capacity for goal-directed, adaptive, self-regulating action across living systems, machines, and hybrids. |
Abstract
Free will is one of the most enduring problems in philosophy and cognitive science, yet what, exactly, requires explanation remains unclear. The most tractable target is the experience of free will – the vivid sense of self-authorship, control, and a felt capacity to have done otherwise. As with the scientific study of mystical experiences, this phenomenology can be investigated without resolving the metaphysical claims implied by its content. Here, I argue that free will is an “easy problem” of consciousness: a phenomenon that can be measured, manipulated, predicted, and mechanistically explained. Taking causal determinism as a working postulate, I consider whether prediction and reinforcement could generate the experience of controlling one’s own actions through causal misattribution and superstitious conditioning, without granting consciousness independent causal power. If the experience can be explained under deterministic constraints, the core scientific explanandum of the free will phenomenon has been addressed. Free will can then be distinguished from agency, which remains a causally consequential, graded capacity for goal-directed, adaptive, and self-regulating action across living systems, machines, and hybrids thereof.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on mystical experience, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Religious and Mystical Experiences as Artifacts of Temporal Lobe Function: A General Hypothesis | 1983 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The Psychedelic Mystical Experience in the Human Encounter with Death | 1969 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Vectorial Cerebral Hemisphericity as Differential Sources for the Sensed Presence, Mystical Experiences and Religious Conversions | 1993 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The epistemic innocence of psychedelic states. | 2016 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Mystical Experience and Religious Doctrine | 1982 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |