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The Illusion of Inner Control: A Hard Determinist Perspective on Consciousness and Agency

Xiaoyang Yu

preprint DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/7b4zn_v1 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that the perceived distinction between an "inner" self and an "external" world is illusory, and that consciousness is an epiphenomenon shaped entirely by neural and environmental determinants. The authors contend that the sense of controlling one's thoughts is a retrospective illusion produced by deterministic brain processes, challenging notions of free will, agency, and responsibility.

Abstract

Humans intuitively perceive a distinction between an "inner" self that they control and an "external" world that is beyond their direct influence. This perceived dichotomy forms the foundation of agency, decision-making, and self-identity. However, from a hard determinist standpoint, this distinction is illusory. If the brain generates thoughts, then the process of thought formation is governed by deterministic causal laws, rendering the so-called "inner self" merely another facet of the external world. This paper argues that consciousness itself is not an autonomous entity but an epiphenomenon shaped entirely by neural and environmental determinants. The perception of controlling one’s thoughts is a retrospective illusion, created by the brain’s deterministic processes rather than actual volitional power. By deconstructing the internal-external divide, we challenge the notion of free will and highlight the implications of determinism for our understanding of agency, responsibility, and decision-making.