CHAPTER 6 Conclusion
W. Klemm
"Seventy-Sevens Are Decreed" October 28, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/b978-0-12-805153-5.00006-7 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the hypothesis of free will survives experimental attacks and that decisions are neither predetermined nor random but shaped by neural population processing; when that processing is guided by conscious agency, the outcome should be regarded as at least partially freely willed. Proposes comparing traveling wave and field potential synchronization across unconscious states (non-REM sleep, concussion, anesthesia) and conscious states (REM sleep, alert wakefulness during complex tasks) as a promising line of research. |
Abstract
The case for conscious agency and free will concludes by emphasizing that despite numerous experimental attacks, the hypothesis of free will is still standing. Scientists devote more effort to pursuing futile attacks on free will than on finding creative ways to test its validity. Very little attempt has been made to compare what is happening during unconscious states like sleep with conscious states involving “doing” various things such as registering pain, vetoing action, performing language operations, being creative, and so on. The kind of research that could be done easily involves a comparison of field potential synchronization and traveling wave phenomena in the same subjects under such varying conditions as the unconsciousness of non-rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, concussion, and anesthesia, with the consciousness states of REM sleep and alert wakefulness while various complex mental tasks are performed. The main mechanism for free will is the existence of neural-mediated decision processes. No one outcome is predetermined but rather is shaped by the neural population processing and its results. In short, decisions are neither predetermined nor made randomly but by the processing. When the processing is guided by conscious agency, the result should be regarded as at least partially freely willed. How the brain makes choices and decisions will eventually receive much more scientific attention as the field of neuroscience evolves with better tools and insights. But what we know now is enough to draw the tentative conclusion that intentions, decisions, and plans can contain a substantial element of free will. We will have to look to neuroscience for enlightenment on this subject—no, not the neuroscience of the 1980s that spawned free-will deniers, but the neuroscience of neural networks that is yet to come.