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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERNAL ASPECT-CONSCIOUSNESS

Andrew Haas

Angelaki September 3, 2026 DOI: 10.1080/0969725x.2026.2737025 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Husserl's temporal account of internal time-consciousness cannot explain how different modes of experiencing coexist at one moment, such as experiencing and having experienced in the present. Proposes that "aspect," irreducible to time, and a phenomenology of internal aspect-consciousness are required to complete the phenomenology of consciousness.

Abstract

Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time-consciousness is supposed to give an account of the possibility of experience and its objects. But if its determinations are merely temporal, it cannot explain how different ways of experiencing are possible at one and the same time; for example, how we can both be experiencing and have experienced in the present. For this, we need aspect (which is irreducible to time) as well as a phenomenology of internal aspect-consciousness – without it, the phenomenology of consciousness remains incomplete.

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