Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement October 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1017/s1358246110000081 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the problem of temporal experience is identical to the problem of phenomenal unity over time, and that Husserl's account of time consciousness resolves this. |
Abstract
AbstractOur perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must also account for phenomenal unity. I look to Edmund Husserl's writings on time consciousness for such an account.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- Moments in Time Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 2011
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- In search of lost time: Integrated information theory needs constraints from temporal phenomenology Philosophy and the Mind Sciences June 3, 2022