Why Revelation Cannot Favor Panpsychism Over Physicalism

The revelation thesis—the idea that introspection or phenomenal concepts reveal the full essence of conscious states—has become central in debates between physicalists and panpsychists. Panpsychists have used it against physicalism, but physicalists argue it creates a parallel problem for panpsychism. David Chalmers proposed a strategy (the distinction strategy) to defend panpsychism by separating the essence of phenomenal properties from their grounds. This paper argues that Chalmers's proposal faces a dilemma: either it fails to genuinely rescue panpsychism, or it can equally be used to rescue physicalism. Thus the revelation thesis does not give panpsychism an advantage over physicalism.

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Abstract

The revelation thesis, namely the claim that introspection or phenomenal concepts reveal the full essence of conscious states, has recently become a central topic in the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, many argue that the plausibility of anti‐physicalist arguments (such as conceivability arguments) depends on it. On the other hand, the revival of panpsychism has also invoked the revelation thesis against physicalism. However, physicalists have pointed out that if the revelation thesis is true, panpsychism faces a parallel difficulty. David Chalmers has proposed a strategy, which I call the distinction strategy (DS) that seeks to defend panpsychism by distinguishing between the essence of phenomenal properties and their grounds. However, this proposal faces a dilemma: either it fails to genuinely rescue panpsychism, or it can equally be used to rescue physicalism. Consequently, Chalmers's proposal does not render panpsychism superior to physicalism, and the revelation thesis cannot serve as a reliable weapon for panpsychists against physicalism. Finally, this paper will offer further reflections on this debate.