Experimental phenomenology
Paolo Bozzi’s Experimental Phenomenology October 9, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/s0166-4115(08)62773-9 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Proposes that experimental phenomenology, which treats mental contents of direct experience as experimental variables, is the proper method for psychological research despite identified limits. |
Abstract
Abstract Through an analysis of the literature in the field and a discussion of facts, a tentative definition of experimental phenomenology is proposed. Experimental phenomenology is regarded as true experimentation. Its experimental variables are mental contents of direct experience rather than physical stimuli or physiological processes. Two limits of the phenomenological approach are pointed out, namely, the occurrence of mental facts that do not belong to the phenomenal scene (habits, forgetting) and the actual impossibility of distinguishing which aspects of a mental fact, such as percept, play the role of causes and which those of effects. Despite these limits, experimental phenomenology is regarded as the proper method for psychological research.