Phenomenological Experience: To the Things Themselves
Dynamic Realism November 25, 2021 DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474480116.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that whether phenomenology counts as a sui generis form of realism or a sui generis form of transcendental idealism depends on which aspect of the correlational a priori is investigated, that is, on the precise mode and object of investigation, with the noema's realist potential as a central focus. |
Abstract
This chapter discusses phenomenological experience introducing phenomenological techniques like reduction and epoché. While the discussion largely remains faithful to Husserl’s texts and provides a close reading of some passages, it does present phenomenology as an encounter, that can be investigated while emphasising various focal points, even after the epoché. The focus of the discussion is the question whether phenomenology is a realist or an idealist endeavour. After establishing that Husserl’s claim that his philosophy is sui generis, some elements of this complex question are addressed, with a focus on an account of the noema and its realist potential. The chapter concludes that, whether one considers phenomenology to be a sui generis form of realism, or a sui generis form of transcendental idealism is related to what aspect of the correlational a-priori is investigated, i.e. to the precise mode and object of investigation.