Conscious intention and motor cognition.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 2005 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.012 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that conscious intentions do not cause actions; instead, the experience of intending to act arises from preparatory activity in frontal and parietal brain areas, and both intention and the sense of agency derive from predictive motor control processes rather than retrospective inference. |
Abstract
The subjective experience of conscious intention is a key component of our mental life. Philosophers studying 'conscious free will' have discussed whether conscious intentions could cause actions, but modern neuroscience rejects this idea of mind-body causation. Instead, recent findings suggest that the conscious experience of intending to act arises from preparation for action in frontal and parietal brain areas. Intentional actions also involve a strong sense of agency, a sense of controlling events in the external world. Both intention and agency result from the brain processes for predictive motor control, not merely from retrospective inference.
Citations in the library
Cited by 29
- Self-awareness, self-regulation, and self-transcendence (S-ART): a framework for understanding the neurobiological mechanisms of mindfulness Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2012
- The biological function of consciousness Frontiers in Psychology August 5, 2014
- Ketamine administration in healthy volunteers reproduces aberrant agency experiences associated with schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry February 6, 2011
- Reading the Freudian theory of sexual drives from a functional neuroimaging perspective. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2014
- Neural correlates of an illusionary sense of agency caused by virtual reality. Cerebral Cortex January 31, 2024
and 24 more in the library
Cites 4
- The Illusion of Conscious Will The MIT Press September 20, 2018
- Altered awareness of voluntary action after damage to the parietal cortex. Nature Neuroscience January 2004
- Intentional action: conscious experience and neural prediction. Consciousness and Cognition December 2003
- Agency and Self-Awareness August 27, 1992