Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness: A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach
Agency and Self-Awareness August 27, 1992 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199245611.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the relationship between action and consciousness is complex and not unequivocal, since many actions occur unconsciously and imagined actions need not be executed. Proposes using the broad term "representation" to span internal states related to action, from goal- and desire-related mental states to pre-movement mechanisms and neural network states, in order to preserve continuity across levels of functioning. |
Abstract
Abstract The mutual relationships of action to consciousness are complex and far from unequivocal. We execute many of our daily actions unconsciously; conversely, we can consciously simulate or imagine actions we do not execute. This vast domain of research, motor cognition, is central to the study, not only of action itself (how it is planned, prepared, and finally executed), but also of how action contributes to the representations we build from objects and from other selves. In this chapter, I will use the broad term of representation to include the various internal states in relation to action. There could be better terms, with the advantage of greater precision, but with the disadvantage of losing continuity between different levels of functioning. Indeed, the term representation of an action can be used in its strong sense, to designate a mental state in relation to goals and desires, as well as in its weak sense, to indicate the ensemble of mechanisms that precede execution of a movement. Finally, it can also be accepted by biologists to designate the state of the neural network during a mental state related to action.