Predictive Processing and the Epistemological Hypothesis: Solving the Hard Problem of Consciousness by Simulating a Brain Facing It
PsyArXiv June 25, 2025 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/2z97y_v3 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper argues that the hard problem of consciousness—explaining why there is subjective experience—can be addressed by combining predictive processing theory with an epistemological hypothesis: a brain that models itself as an entity facing a world generates the experience of being a conscious subject. The author proposes that consciousness arises when a predictive system simulates its own perspective, thereby solving the explanatory gap without invoking dualism or panpsychism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Proposes that predictive processing, applied recursively to the brain's own operations, can solve the hard problem of consciousness by explaining subjective experience as a product of self-simulation. |
Abstract
Predictive Processing and the Epistemological Hypothesis: Solving the Hard Problem of Consciousness by Simulating a Brain Facing It