Dualism and the Problem of Other Minds
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind June 25, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780198994121.003.0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that knowledge of other minds requires mental state hypotheses in explanations of behavior, thereby refuting epiphenomenalism, mind/brain identity theory, and functionalism. Proposes that passing the Turing Test provides no evidence for AI mental states. |
Abstract
Abstract How do we know about other people’s minds? The most plausible answer is that hypotheses about others’ mental states figure in the best explanations for other people’s behavior. This answer clashes with prominent views in philosophy of mind, including epiphenomenalism, the mind/brain identity theory, and functionalism. Partisans of those views hold that the ascription of mental states does not add any predictive or explanatory power, compared to a complete, purely physical account of persons. These views thus fail to accommodate knowledge of other minds and should therefore be rejected. I also argue that we have no reason to believe that AI systems possess mental states, even if they pass the Turing Test.