XII-Is There a Problem of Other Minds?
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society October 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00314.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 17 |
| Key points | Argues that a distinctive conceptual problem of other minds arises from the way mental occurrences are presented to the subject, and that this problem is a genuine issue in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people, contrary to scepticism about its interest. |
Abstract
Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.