Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience
European Journal of Philosophy December 1, 2016 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12202 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractP. F. Strawson argued that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. This essay evaluates that claim, explicating Strawson's thesis and reconstructing his argument, then identifying where it fails. The author uses Kant's remarks on the passivity of experience to propose an alternative: in self-ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects, providing a different route from unity to objectivity.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that Strawson's argument from unity of consciousness to objectivity fails, but that Kant's concept of passivity offers an alternative route. |
Abstract
AbstractIn the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ ofThe Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences if we are to self‐ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self‐ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity.