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Consciousness and modality: on the possible preserved visual consciousness in blindsight subjects.

Morten Overgaard, Thor Grünbaum

Consciousness and Cognition September 17, 2011 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.016 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Humans Unconsciousness Visual perception
Key points Argues that Brogaard's claim that blindsight subject GR is fully unconscious of correctly identified stimuli does not succeed, because relevant empirical evidence opposes it and the argument misconstrues the necessary criteria for deciding whether a conscious experience is visual.

Abstract

In a recent paper, Brogaard (2011) presents counter-arguments to the conclusions of an experiment with blindsight subject GR. She argues that contrary to the apparent findings that GR's preserved visual abilities relate to degraded visual experiences, she is in fact fully unconscious of the stimuli she correctly identifies. In this paper, we present arguments and evidence why Brogaard's argument does not succeed in its purpose. We suggest that not only is relevant empirical evidence in opposition to Brogaard's argument, her argument misconstrues necessary criteria to decide whether a conscious experience is visual or not visual.

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