El papel de la darse-previo en la fenomenología trascendental
R. Walton
Phainomenon October 1, 2003 DOI: 10.2478/phainomenon-2003-0045 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Fink's account of pregivenness overstates apperceptive or secondary pregivenness because it does not address the pregivenness that precedes acts and serves as the condition of possibility for primary passivity; the paper suggests reasons for this omission while showing how pregivenness, givenness, and non-givenness function within transcendental phenomenology and how the reduction transforms the pregivenness of the world into the pregivenness of world-constitution. |
Abstract
Abstract This article is an attempt to clarify the role of pregivenness by drawing on the accounts afforded by Eugen Fink both in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and in the complementary writings to this study. Pregivenness is first situated, along with givenness and non-givenness, within the framework of the system of transcendental phenomenology. As a second step, an examination is undertaken of the dimensions of pregivenness in the natural attitude. Next, nonpregivenness in the transcendental sphere is examined with a focus upon the way in which indeterminateness does not undermine the possibility of a transcendental foreknowledge in the natural attitude, and on the other hand implies the productive character of phenomenological knowledge. After showing how, with the reduction, the pregivennes of the world turns into the pregivenness of world-constitution, the paper addresses the problems raised by the nonpregivenness both of the depth-levels and the reach of transcendental life. By unfolding these lines of inquiry, transcendental phenomenology surmounts the provisional analysis of constitution at the surface level as well as the limitation of transcendental life to the egological sphere. Finally, it is contended that Fink’s account of pregivenness overstates apperceptive or secondary pregivenenness because is does not deal with the pregivenness that precedes acts and is the condition of possibility for primary passivity. Reasons for the omission of impressional or primary pregivenness are suggested.