Who Is the Subject of Phenomenology? Husserl and Fink on the Transcendental Ego

The article addresses a longstanding puzzle in Husserlian phenomenology: the identity of the transcendental ego, the subject of transcendental phenomenology, and its relation to the empirical ego of the individual phenomenologist. Drawing on Eugen Fink's concept of a "personal union" between these two egos in his Sixth Cartesian Meditation and on Husserl's First Philosophy lectures, the author develops an account in which the transcendental ego is a mode of self-investigation by the phenomenologist. This interpretation, the author argues, preserves the transcendental status of phenomenology while deflecting certain criticisms.

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Abstract

ABSTRACT One long-running conundrum in Husserlian phenomenology revolves around the question of the identity of what Husserl calls the transcendental ego, a mysterious figure that he identifies as the subject of a genuinely transcendental phenomenology. In dialogue with both Husserl and his assistant and collaborator Eugen Fink (as well as recent commentary), I attempt in this article to give a solid account of the identity of this transcendental ego, and in particular to explain the connection between this figure and the empirical ego of the individual phenomenologist. I make particular reference to Fink's depiction of a "personal union" between these two egos in his Sixth Cartesian Meditation and to certain unclear hints in Husserl's 1923/1924 lectures on First Philosophy. Ultimately, I develop my own account of such a union, which explains the transcendental ego as a certain mode in which the phenomenologist might investigate his own experiences. On this basis, I argue, the status of phenomenology as a transcendental discipline can be understood without subjecting that discipline to certain criticisms that have been levelled against it.