The Concept of Transcendental Apperception and its Role in the Second Edition of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction
Vera Lyubenova
Filosofiya-Philosophy July 12, 2024 DOI: 10.53656/phil2024-02-05 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Kant's doctrine of transcendental apperception resolves problematic features of Rationalist and Empiricist theories of consciousness, and that contrasting it with Locke's and Hume's inner sense, Descartes's Cogito, and Leibniz's intellectual intuition clarifies its meaning and its role in justifying the pure concepts of understanding. |
Abstract
The aim of this article is to trace the meaning that Immanuel Kant assigns to the concept of transcendental apperception and to present its role in the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction in his Critique of Pure Reason. It will be shown that the doctrine of transcendental apperception resolves some problematic features of the theories of consciousness in the traditions of Rationalism and Empiricism. In this regard, Kant’s transcendental apperception will be examined in contrast with the concepts of inner sense (John Locke and David Hume), Cogito (René Descartes), and intellectual intuition (Gottfried Leibniz). This comparative approach will allow us to gain a clearer understanding of the meaning of transcendental apperception. Finally, its role in the justification of the pure concepts of understanding will be considered.