Peculiar Access
Pierre-Jean Renaudie, Jack Reynolds
Routledge eBooks October 10, 2023 DOI: 10.4324/9780429455919-5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that Sartre's theory of pre-reflective consciousness need not be read as fully opposing the naturalist critique, since pre-reflective experience should not be framed in terms of a first-/third-person distinction. This dimension still affords a distinctive self-access, but one that grants no infallible first-person epistemic privilege and instead grounds a transformative process enabling self-knowledge. |
Abstract
In the debates on phenomenal consciousness that occurred over the last 20 years, Sartre’s analysis of pre-reflective consciousness has often been quoted in defence of a distinction between first- and third-personal modes of givenness that naturalists reject. This distinction aims both at determining the specificity of the access one has to their own thoughts, beliefs, intentions, or desires, and at justifying the particular privilege that one enjoys while making epistemic claims about their own mental states. This chapter defends an interpretation of Sartre’s theory of pre-reflective consciousness that does not put him completely at odds with the naturalist critique and stresses that one’s pre-reflective experience should not be understood in terms of first-/third-person differentiation. This pre-reflective dimension of experience nevertheless allows a peculiar access to oneself, which grants no infallible epistemic privilege to the first-person, but lays the ground for a transformative process that makes self-knowledge possible.