Svasaṃvitti as Methodological Solipsism: “Narrow Content” and the Problem of Intentionality in Buddhist Philosophy of Mind

The chapter argues that the Buddhist concept of *svasamvitti* (reflexive awareness) and Fodor's methodological solipsism share a core commitment: the immediate content of consciousness is always a mental representation, never an external phenomenon. It explores various interpretations of this claim in Indian Buddhist literature from the 6th through 19th centuries and notes that arguments for these positions are strikingly similar in form and detail to those Fodor offered. The authors propose that contemporary cognitive science can engage in fruitful dialogue with Buddhist philosophy.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This chapter draws connections between the idea of svasamvitti or svasamvedana (reflexive awareness, apperception), a phenomenon very controversial in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy from the 6th through the 19th centuries, and the idea of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, made popular by Fodor in the late 20th century. It explores many interpretations in Indian Buddhist literature of the claim that cognition is always reflexive, but extracts as a core of all of these views the commitment that the immediate content of consciousness is always a mental representation and never an external phenomenon; thus, in order to understand consciousness and its contents, one must bracket the external world. The chapter explores the arguments for these positions and notes that they are strikingly similar in form and in detail to those offered by Fodor in defense of essentially the same thesis. It suggests that even contemporary cognitive science can be in fruitful dialogue with Buddhist philosophy.