Svasaṃvitti as Methodological Solipsism: “Narrow Content” and the Problem of Intentionality in Buddhist Philosophy of Mind
Oxford University Press eBooks September 10, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381559.003.0010 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Solipsism Intentionality Epistemology Apperception Consciousness Reflexivity Buddhist philosophy Phenomenon Content measure theory Mental representation Cognition Social science |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that the Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awareness and Fodor's methodological solipsism both assert that the immediate content of consciousness is always a mental representation, not an external object, and that their supporting arguments are strikingly similar. |
Abstract
This chapter draws connections between the idea of svasamvitti or svasamvedana (reflexive awareness, apperception), a phenomenon very controversial in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy from the 6th through the 19th centuries, and the idea of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, made popular by Fodor in the late 20th century. It explores many interpretations in Indian Buddhist literature of the claim that cognition is always reflexive, but extracts as a core of all of these views the commitment that the immediate content of consciousness is always a mental representation and never an external phenomenon; thus, in order to understand consciousness and its contents, one must bracket the external world. The chapter explores the arguments for these positions and notes that they are strikingly similar in form and in detail to those offered by Fodor in defense of essentially the same thesis. It suggests that even contemporary cognitive science can be in fruitful dialogue with Buddhist philosophy.