Ramseyan humility: the response from revelation and panpsychism
Raamy Majeed
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017 DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2016.1226670 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | The paper sets out and evaluates David Lewis's suggestion that Ramseyan humility—our inability to identify the fundamental properties occupying nomological roles—may admit an exception if one accepts both panphenomenalism, the view that all instantiated fundamental properties are qualia, and the identification thesis, the view that acquaintance with our qualia reveals their identities. |
Abstract
Abstract: David Lewis argues for Ramseyan humility, the thesis that we can’t identify the fundamental properties that occupy the nomological roles at our world. Lewis, however, remarks that there is a potential exception to this, which involves assuming two views concerning qualia (i) panphenomenalism (contemporary panpsychism): all instantiated fundamental properties are qualia and (ii) the identification thesis (revelation): we can know the identities of our qualia simply by being acquainted with them. This paper aims to provide an exposition, as well as an assessment, of this response to the humility thesis.
Citations in the library
Cites 4
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism Oxford University Press eBooks May 29, 2008
- Should a materialist believe in Qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy March 1, 1995
- Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness Dialectica 2009
- Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Epiphenomenalism Dialectica 1977