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What if consciousness has no function?

Susan Blackmore

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2016 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x15002010 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Commentary Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that a proposed theory of consciousness is implicitly dualist or Cartesian materialist, assigns consciousness a function without considering that it may have none of its own, and invokes "subset consensus" and "integration consensus" that the author contends do not exist in the literature.

Abstract

Abstract: An implicitly dualist or Cartesian materialist theory of consciousness is proposed without citing the many well-known problems with such theories. A function for consciousness is proposed with no reference to the possibility that “consciousness itself” has no function of its own. The theory builds on proposed “subset consensus” and “integration consensus” when in the literature there is no such consensus on these issues.

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