Skip to content

The exercise of epoché and the variations of the transcendent in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl

C. Tourinho

April 30, 2012 DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2012.131.03 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Husserl generalizes the epoche beyond the certainty of the cogitatio, so that the transcendent is understood as the domain where doubt about the existence of things and the empirical self cannot be eliminated. Contends that the intended object retains its otherness even in its reduced, immanent form, and that the reduction opens a new dimension of the consciousness-world relation that preserves genuine immanent objectivity.

Abstract

The epoche is initially on what is transcendent in the sense of what is outside intellectual experience. Attention is focused on what is revealed in the cogitatio. But Husserl goes beyond of the so-called “certainty of cogitatio” by generalizing the suspension of judgment. The transcendent is to be understood as the domain where we cannot eliminate the possibility of doubt as to the position of existence of things and the empirical self. Despite immanence, the intended object does not lose, in its reduced version, its otherness. We then see a third use of the term “transcendent”. This reduction reveals a new dimension of the relationship between consciousness and the world, preventing authentic immanent objectivity from disappearing. Key words: phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, consciousness, world, transcendent.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Explore topics