Grounding, conceivability, and the mind-body problem
Hasen Khudairi
Synthese November 8, 2016 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1254-2 (opens in new tab)
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Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the two-dimensional conceivability argument against deriving phenomenal truths from physical truths is unsound. A hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness shows that ontological dependencies between consciousness and physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints recorded through conceivability, i.e., epistemic possibility. |
Abstract
This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceivability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths (cf. Chalmers in The conscious mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; The character of consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) in light of a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability—i.e., the epistemic possibility—thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.