Conceivability in philosophy of mind

Abstract

The paper presents a reconstruction of various approaches to understanding such an element of philosophical methodology as conceivability. From the point of view of such a section of the theory of knowledge as modal epistemology, this method is interesting because it al­lows us to acquire knowledge about the nature of various objects, expressed by modal state­ments. In other words, this knowledge is about necessary or possible truths, about the pres­ence or absence of necessary identity or essential properties. In the last few decades, this method has been actively used to solve problems in the philosophy of mind. With its help, ar­guments are formulated against materialism, against the thesis that the mind is necessarily connected with the physical. For the first time, we find such an argument in R. Descartes. One of the sections of the paper is devoted to the reconstruction of his views. Another part of the work is dedicated to the analysis of criticism of classical views on the nature of con­ceivability. This criticism is primarily associated with the turn in understanding the nature of necessary and contingent truths, which was initiated by S. Kripke. Another stage in the dis­cussion of the role of conceivability in the knowledge of modal truths, which is considered in the text, is connected with the development of two-dimensional semantics. The paper re­constructs D. Chalmers's views based on this semantics about the existence of several types of conceivability, as well as his version of the argument from conceivability directed against materialism.