A language for qualia: on verbal influence of the phenomenal

The explanatory gap—the difficulty of fully describing subjective sensory experiences in words—can be re-framed as the relative ineffability of phenomenal properties. This paper argues that such experiences can be communicated verbally through a special type of discursive unit called a phenomeme, which references relational properties of sensory experiences. The analysis suggests that phenomenal contents are not absolutely ineffable but can be conveyed via these units, which constitute a narrative dimension. The work highlights potential applications for pragmatics, cognitive stylistics, and other language-related fields.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Despite several decades of intense scrutiny, the problem of the “explanatory gap” remains one of the most topical issues in today’s cognitive sciences. This paper argues that, if re-articulated as the (relative) ineffability of phenomenal properties of sensory experiences, it can become an object of linguistic treatment to a sensible effect. The paper proceeds from discussing the problem of ineffability at large to a brief analysis of the current accounts of phenomenal mental states. It then proposes a tentative descriptive framework for phenomenal judgments, i.e. statements involving reference to the speaker’s qualia. The main argument of the paper consists in relativization of the ineffability thesis and in establishing that phenomenal contents can be communicated verbally via a special type of discursive units––phenomemes––by way of referencing relational properties of the sensory experiences in question. In the concluding section, the paper suggests that phenomemes constitute a narrative dimension and highlights the potential of further research on the subject for the pragmatics of communication, cognitive stylistics, and other areas of the language-related scholarship.