What is it Like to be a Group Agent?
Noûs July 28, 2016 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12162 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 179 |
| Key points | Argues that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness, drawing on integrated information theory to support this tentative position against Schwitzgebel's view, and suggests this has implications for the normative status of group agents. |
Abstract
Abstract The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness ( pace Schwitzgebel ). In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much‐discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.
Citations in the library
Cited by 5
- Consciousness Incorporated Journal of Social Philosophy March 1, 2018
- Moral Agency without Consciousness Canadian Journal of Philosophy June 30, 2025
- A systematic review of integrated information theory: a perspective from artificial intelligence and the cognitive sciences Neural Computing and Applications February 7, 2023
- Conscious Subjects, Conscious Unity, and Five Arguments for Anti-Combination Combining Minds February 20, 2019
- Integrated information as a metric for group interaction. PLoS One 2018
Cites 5
- Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head Mind October 1, 2009
- Consciousness and Cognitive Access Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society October 1, 2008
- Consciousness: here, there and everywhere? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences May 19, 2015
- From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0 PLoS Comput. Biol. May 1, 2014
- A framework for consciousness Nature Neuroscience February 1, 2003