Moral Agency without Consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness is not a necessary condition for moral agency. The paper argues that an entity can instantiate four key capacities—action, moral concept possession, responsiveness to moral reasons, and moral understanding—without being conscious. It defends a picture of nonconscious moral agency as a plausible account of an entity that can act for moral reasons and be morally responsible, and discusses broader implications, especially for the possibility of artificial moral agency.

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Abstract

Many views of moral agency include, implicitly or explicitly, a consciousness requirement—namely, the claim that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition of moral agency. This paper casts doubt on the consciousness requirement. I argue that consciousness is not necessary for instantiating four key capacities necessary for moral agency: action, moral concept possession, responsiveness to moral reasons, and moral understanding. I defend my picture of nonconscious moral agency as a plausible account of an entity that can act for moral reasons and can be morally responsible. Lastly, I discuss broader implications of my argument, especially on the possibility of artificial moral agency.