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Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind

Giuseppina D’Oro, Paul Giladi, Alexis Papazoglou

Inquiry July 2, 2018 DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2018.1484001 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 1
Key points Argues that the metaphilosophical assumptions of analytic philosophy of mind gave rise to the question of how mind fits within nature, and that some non-reductivist approaches challenge the fruitfulness of this question rather than trying to solve the "placement" problem.

Abstract

This paper discusses the metaphilosophical assumptions that have dominated analytic philosophy of mind, and how they gave rise to the central question that the best-known forms of non-reductivism available have sought to answer, namely: how can mind fit within nature? Its goal is to make room for forms of non-reductivism that have challenged the fruitfulness of this question, and which have taken a different approach to the so-called “placement” problem. Rather than trying to solve the placement problem, the forms of non-reductivism discussed in this paper have put pressure on the metaphilosophical assumptions that have given rise to the question of the place of mind in nature in the first instance.

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