Aspects in Dual‐Aspect Monism and Panpsychism: A Rejoinder to Benovsky
Baptiste Le Bihan
Philosophical Investigations September 3, 2018 DOI: 10.1111/phin.12220 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that Benovsky's anti-realist interpretation of the mental and physical aspects of natural entities collapses into neutral monism, and proposes instead a realist interpretation of those aspects as an interesting alternative, closing with a discussion of its relation to panpsychism. |
Abstract
Abstract Neutral monism aims at solving the hard problem of consciousness by positing entities that are neither mental nor physical. Benovsky has recently argued for the slightly different account that, rather than being neutral, natural entities are both mental and physical by having different aspects, and then argued in favour of an anti‐realist interpretation of those aspects. In this essay, operating under the assumption of dual‐aspect monism, I argue to the contrary in favour of a realist interpretation of these aspects by showing that the anti‐realist interpretation collapses into neutral monism and that the realist interpretation is an interesting alternative. I close with a discussion of the realist interpretation of the aspects and its relation with panpsychism.