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Kinds of access: different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access.

Morten Overgaard, Kristian Sandberg

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences May 1, 2012 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0425 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Humans Cognition Consciousness Introversion, psychological
Key points Argues that different methods of reporting conscious experience are not interchangeable, since recent experiments show different results with different kinds of reporting, and hypothesizes that differences in scale sensitivity may reflect distinct types of access used for direct reports about experiences versus metacognitive reports about the classification process.

Abstract

In experimental investigations of consciousness, participants are asked to reflect upon their own experiences by issuing reports about them in different ways. For this reason, a participant needs some access to the content of her own conscious experience in order to report. In such experiments, the reports typically consist of some variety of ratings of confidence or direct descriptions of one's own experiences. Whereas different methods of reporting are typically used interchangeably, recent experiments indicate that different results are obtained with different kinds of reporting. We argue that there is not only a theoretical, but also an empirical difference between different methods of reporting. We hypothesize that differences in the sensitivity of different scales may reveal that different types of access are used to issue direct reports about experiences and metacognitive reports about the classification process.

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