The Report Is Not Simply in the Mind
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) August 21, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22037558 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the phenomenal/access distinction should not be treated as a division between components or levels of a mental state, because accessibility varies across action, memory, decision, and report, and is partly constituted by environmental organization. Proposes a methodological tool for refining under-specified distinctions in consciousness research. |
Abstract
We argue that the phenomenal/access distinction should not automatically be treated as a division between two components or levels of a mental state. Information can become accessible in different relations to action, memory, decision, and report, and these relations are partly constituted by the environments in which cognitive activity is organized. Linguistic report represents a particularly important case: the linguistic medium is itself a historically collective organization of the organism's environment, and therefore cannot be treated as an external readout of an independently completed inner state. After our argumentation we propose a methodological tool for detecting and refining under-specified distinctions in consciousness research.