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An Active Inference Model of Conscious Access with and without Report

Christopher J. Whyte, Jakob Hohwy, Ryan Smith

September 6, 2021 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/mkzx8 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points The authors propose that a computational model based on active inference, in which working memory gating is a cognitive action, can reproduce findings from no-report paradigms: late P3b-like ERPs and increased PFC activity depend on report demands, but even without report demands simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability. They argue that evidence from no-report paradigms therefore does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.

Abstract

Cognitive theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory and higher-order theories, posit that frontoparietal circuits play a crucial role in conscious access. However, recent studies using no-report paradigms have posed a challenge to cognitive theories by demonstrating conscious accessibility in the apparent absence of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. To address this challenge, this paper presents a computational model of conscious access, based upon active inference, that treats working memory gating as a cognitive action. We simulate a visual masking task and show that late P3b-like event-related potentials (ERPs), and increased PFC activity, are induced by the working memory demands of report. When reporting demands are removed, these late ERPs vanish and PFC activity is reduced. These results therefore reproduce, and potentially explain, results from no-report paradigms. However, even without reporting demands, our model shows that simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability – maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Therefore, our simulations show that evidence provided by no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.

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