The 1990s witnessed a pivotal shift in philosophy of mind and cognitive science with the rise of the 4E approaches: embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition. These frameworks challenged the classical cognitive science paradigm that viewed cognition as internal symbolic computation confined to the brain. Instead, 4E cognition conceives mental processes as distributed across brain,...
This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts...
In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand normativity non-socially. We...