Making the Invisible Visible
Bernhard Geißler
Journal für Psychologie July 1, 2023 DOI: 10.30820/0942-2285-2023-1-173 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the assumption that first-person-perspective methods are incompatible with the concept of the unconscious is wrong: phenomenology can access the unconscious and account for its systematic independence, and accepting the unconscious does not imply rejecting first-person-foundationalism. |
Abstract
Advocates of first-person-perspective-methods (FPPM) claim that any psychological concept must be grounded in a descriptive analysis (first-person-foundationalism). It is often assumed that the concept of the unconscious is incompatible with FPPM, and that its acceptance implies the rejection of first-person-foundationalism. This view is based on the following assumption: either FPPM are generally incapable of engaging with the unconscious, or FPPM are incapable of accounting for the systematic independence of the unconscious. It is the aim of this paper to show that this assumption is wrong. I argue that a) phenomenology has access to the unconscious, b) phenomenology can account for the systematic independence of the unconscious, and c) accepting the concept of the unconscious does imply the rejection of first-person-foundationalism.