Patients with Disorders of Consciousness: Are They Nonconscious, Unconscious, or Subconscious? Expanding the Discussion.
Andrew A Fingelkurts, Alexander A Fingelkurts
Brain Sciences May 17, 2023 DOI: 10.3390/brainsci13050814 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 9 |
| Key points | Argues that confusion among the terms unconsciousness, nonconsciousness, and subconsciousness hinders ethical and clinical decisions in disorders of consciousness, and proposes that an evolving EEG neuroimaging technique could help distinguish these states more precisely, particularly in borderline cases, while connecting these distinctions to experiential selfhood and the moral significance of what makes life worth living. |
Abstract
Unprecedented advancements in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) have given rise to ethical questions about how to recognize and respect autonomy and a sense of agency of the personhood when those capacities are themselves disordered, as they typically are in patients with DoC. At the intersection of these questions rests the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. Indeed, evaluations of consciousness levels and capacity for recovery have a significant impact on decisions regarding whether to discontinue or prolong life-sustaining therapy for DoC patients. However, in the unconsciousness domain, there is the confusing array of terms that are regularly used interchangeably, making it quite challenging to comprehend what unconsciousness is and how it might be empirically grounded. In this opinion paper, we will provide a brief overview of the state of the field of unconsciousness and show how a rapidly evolving electroencephalogram (EEG) neuroimaging technique may offer empirical, theoretical, and practical tools to approach unconsciousness and to improve our ability to distinguish consciousness from unconsciousness and also nonconsciousness with greater precision, particularly in cases that are borderline (as is typical in patients with DoC). Furthermore, we will provide a clear description of three distant notions of (un)consciousness (unconsciousness, nonconsciousness, and subconsciousness) and discuss how they relate to the experiential selfhood which is essential for comprehending the moral significance of what makes life worth living.
Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- Self, Me, or I? Unravelling the Triumvirate of Selfhood in Pathological Consciousness. Brain Sciences June 13, 2025
- The Quest for a Unifying Definition and Taxonomy of Consciousness: Narrowing the Obstacles to Mutual Understanding Qeios February 26, 2026
- The Study of Consciousness Is Mired in Complexities and Difficulties: Can They Be Resolved? Qeios September 29, 2024
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and 49 more in the library