"Consciousness Is the Property of Dialectic": What Hegel Taught Merleau-Ponty about Intentionality
Dimitris Apostolopoulos
Journal of the history of philosophy October 1, 2023 DOI: 10.1353/hph.2023.a909129 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Merleau-Ponty's reading of Hegel's account of experience significantly influenced his recasting of intentionality, informing the claims that intentional relations are more fundamental than their relata and that a metaphysical condition irreducible to consciousness or object structures intentionality. These positions inform key tenets of reversibility, and a revisionary interpretation of Hegel's absolute offers a model for the principle individuating the basic conditions of experience. The author contends that Merleau-Ponty was a more assiduous reader of Hegel than many assume and that his later thought inherits significant idealist commitments. |
Abstract
abstract: I argue that Merleau-Ponty's reading of Hegel's account of experience exerts a significant and hitherto overlooked influence on his attempt to recast Phénoménologie de la perception 's account of intentionality. This reading informs two important claims of his later projects: that intentional relations are more fundamental than their relata, and that a metaphysical condition irreducible to consciousness or object constitutes the structure of intentionality. I argue that these positions inform key tenets of reversibility, and that a revisionary interpretation of Hegel's absolute offers Merleau-Ponty a model for the principle that individuates the basic conditions of experience. In addition to demonstrating that he was a more assiduous reader of Hegel than many commentators assume, and highlighting some overlooked debts to Hegel, these results show that Merleau-Ponty's later thought inherits significant idealist commitments, which should motivate us to reconsider its standing within post-Kantian philosophical currents.