Behaviourism in Disguise: The Triviality of Ramsey Sentence Functionalism
T. S. Lowther
Axiomathes February 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-020-09511-w (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Newman's objection, along with a new formal variation using mathematical induction, undermines the modified Ramsey sentence as a formalization of functionalism. The proofs suggest that functionalism so formalized trivially reduces to behaviourism plus a cardinality constraint on relations between mental-relevant behaviours, which the author contends makes the Ramsey sentence unsatisfactory for functionalism. |
Abstract
Abstract: Functionalism has become one of the predominant theories in the philosophy of mind, with its many merits supposedly including its capacity for precise formulation. The most common method to express this precise formulation is by means of the modified Ramsey sentence. In this article, I will apply work from the field of the philosophy of science to functionalism for the first time, examining how Newman’s objection undermines the Ramsey sentence as a means of formalising functionalism. I will also present a formal variation on Newman’s objection through mathematical induction. Together, these proofs suggest that functionalism formalised by the Ramsey sentence trivially reduces to a kind of behaviourism plus a cardinality constraint on the number of relations holding between mental-relevant behaviours. As most functionalists see functionalism as a distinct theory of mind from behaviourism, this suggests that the modified Ramsey sentence cannot form a satisfactory formalism for functionalism.