Ego na fenomenologia. Crítica de Sartre ao Ego transcendental de Husserl
Pedro Dias
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia August 12, 2022 DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2022_78_3_0985 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Sartre's account of the ego as a product of consciousness, constituted as a subterfuge to escape freedom and anguish, rests on existential inferences that cannot be validated within transcendental phenomenology due to their doxic character. Proposes instead that Husserl's egological approach better describes subjectivity as a continuous self-appropriating unfolding through modalities of consciousness, not a multiplication of 'I's. |
Abstract
This study approach the critique of the transcendental ego in phenomenology in La transcendance de l’Ego, where Sartre confronts the “consistency” of a psychic and psychophysical ego. The research is directed towards understanding how a consciousness that does not have, a priori, any egological structure ends up, as “artificial functionality” and “in interiority”, constituting it as an “object”, to then identify with him, affirming himself as being him, in a sui generis relationship of «identity and indistinction». Therefore, throughout the reflection, as he reveals what he claims to be a «pre-personal» character of consciousness, the philosopher questions the reason for this movement by which it ends up «reifying», identifying itself with the psychic ego which it itself constitutes as a transcendent object. The aim here is to approach the existential inferences – not subscribed by the reasoning that is developed –, of Sartre when he concludes that this ego is a «product» of the conscience itself, which constitutes it, projects itself and identifies with it as a subterfuge to escape its full spontaneity and freedom that are a reason for her anguish. In this context, it is thought that, due to the “doxic character” they contain, all existential positions cannot be confirmed in the light of transcendental phenomenology. The egological approach to subjectivity in Husserl’s phenomenology is considered to be a continuous process of self-appropriating unfolding. However, this does not imply an undue multiplication of “I’s”, but refers, above all, to “modalities” of a consciousness that unfolds in a multiplicity of acts and subjects.