Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central
G. Ongaro, Doug I Hardman, Ivan Deschenaux
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences July 15, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-022-09827-5 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe mind is not confined to the brain but extends into the physical world, a view known as the extended mind thesis. Philosophical debate has largely focused on how the mind uses tools and artifacts to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artifacts, it also extends to other humans when pursuing collective tasks. This extension corresponds to the 'we-mode' of cognition, where minds are jointly directed at goals or values, distinct from a group mind. Because collective intentionality evolves and develops before human use of artifacts, the extended mind is a central aspect of human existence, not a special phenomenon. This revised thesis carries deeper implications for cognitive science than originally thought.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that if the mind extends to artefacts for individual tasks, it extends to other humans for collective tasks, and that this capacity for collective intentionality makes the extended mind a central aspect of the human condition. |
Abstract
The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to other humans corresponds essentially to the ‘we-mode’ of cognition, the unique power of human minds to be jointly directed at goals, intentions, states of affairs, or values (which, importantly, differs from having a ‘group mind’). Because the capacity for collective intentionality holds evolutionary and developmental primacy over human-epistemic artefacts relations, the extended mind should not be seen as a special phenomenon, but as a central aspect of the human condition. The original extended mind thesis carried important implications for how the cognitive sciences should proceed. In a version of the thesis that accommodates collective intentionality, these implications would go far deeper than originally assumed.