Defending the Bounds of Cognition
The MIT Press eBooks May 21, 2010 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 188 |
| Key points | Argues that Clark's extended mind hypothesis commits a "coupling-constitution fallacy" by equating coupling with constitution, and that the nature of an object's internal processes is relevant to whether it performs cognition. |
Abstract
This chapter discusses the flaws of Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark’s hypothesis assumes that the nature of the processes internal to an object has nothing to do with whether that object carries out cognitive processing. The only condition required is that the object is coupled with a cognitive agent and interacts with it in a certain way. In making this tenuous connection, Clark commits the most common mistake extended mind theorists make; alleging that an object becomes cognitive once it is connected to a cognitive agent is a “coupling-constitution fallacy.” From this fallacy, many hastily proceed to the conclusion that the object or process constitutes part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing.