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Mysticism without the Mustikos? Some Reflections on Stephen Palmquist’s Mystical Kant

Swami Medhananda (Ayon Maharaj)

Kantian Review December 18, 2020 DOI: 10.1017/s1369415420000473 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Mysticism
Key points Argues that while Palmquist is right that Kant admits the possibility of certain indirect forms of mystical experience, Palmquist overstates Kant's mysticism and fails to convincingly justify two main claims: that Kant was a mystic or had strong mystical tendencies, and that some experiences central to Kant's philosophy are best understood as mystical.

Abstract

Abstract This article critically examines some of the main arguments of Stephen Palmquist’s Kant and Mysticism. While I agree with Palmquist that Kant admits the possibility of certain indirect forms of mystical experience, I argue that Palmquist makes Kant out to be more of a mystic than he actually was. In particular, I contend that Palmquist fails to provide convincing justification of two of his main claims: (1) that Kant was a mystic or at least had strong mystical tendencies and (2) that some of the experiences that are central to Kant’s philosophy are best understood as mystical experiences.

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